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California State Disability Insurance:
Privatization Is the Answer
to Employee Woes
By KELLY L. KNUDSON*
WITH THE WORLD'S fifth-largest economy, California's labor
force consists of almost eighteen million workers.' California workers
rely on their income to pay for shelter, food, and to support their
families.2 As a result, the ability of a person to earn a living is one of
her most important assets.3 An off-the-job injury can ruin a person
financially if it prevents her from working. 4 Therefore, the wage-re-
placement system that a state chooses and whether the system works
are of critical importance.
California's current wage-replacement system, known as the State
Disability Insurance ("SDI") program, provides benefits for workers
injured off-the-job. Despite its importance to the State, the SDI pro-
gram has been the subject of negative press and calls for reform due
to improper claim processing that costs the program millions of dol-
lars in cost overruns.5 The administrative problems inherent in the
current system are not only costly to the program but also to those
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1. See Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't, California Profile, http://www.labormarketinfo.
edd. ca. gov/cgi / databrowsing/localAreaProfileQSResults. asp? selectedarea = California&
selectedindex=O&menuChoice=localAreaPro&state=true&geogArea=0601000000&county
Name= (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
2. See generally Peter G. Gosselin, The New Deal: If America Is Richer, Why Are Its Families
So Much Less Secure?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2004, at Al.
3. See Paul Silverman, Protect Your Ability to Earn a Living, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan.
28, 1996, at F-4.
4. See generally Gosselin, supra note 2.
5. See Robert Sallady, Disability Plan Loses Millions; State Insurance Program's Costs Sky-
rocket Through Errors, Abuse, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Disability Plan
Loses Millions].
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eligible claimants who never receive benefits due to processing
mistakes.
Additionally, limits on the duration for which workers can collect
SDI may potentially cause workers who suffer off-thejob injuries fi-
nancial hardship. 6 These limits affect workers who suffer long term
injuries as they may be left with no wage-replacement options if they
do not have private disability insurance. 7
The program also caps payment amounts at a low income level
causing high income earners to suffer disproportionate wage losses.8
A hypothetical example of an injured worker illustrates the problem.
Sam is a thirty-five year old systems analyst working in Silicon Valley
and earning $75,000 per year. He recently bought a home and spends
most weekends working on improving it. Due to high home prices in
the Bay Area, Sam is stretched to the limit to make his mortgage pay-
ment, and between the house and his other regular expenses, Sam
spends his entire paycheck each month.
One Saturday, Sam is trimming trees in his yard and falls off of a
ladder. He injures his back and is unable to return to work for five
months. Sam has no money in his savings account as it all went to-
wards the down payment on his house. How will Sam afford to make
his mortgage payment and pay the monthly bills he owes while he is
unable to work? He does not qualify for workers' compensation be-
cause he was not injured on-the-job. 9
Sam does have options to supplement at least part of the wages
he will lose for the five months that he is unable to work. First, he
qualifies for SDI.10 Second, if he has purchased private disability insur-
ance, this will also supplement his lost income. 1 These options, how-
ever, do not solve Sam's problem. Because of payment limits, SDI will
6. See generally CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2653 (West 1986 & Supp. 2005).
7. See Fred Cook, Selling Disability in California: Finding Plans that Bridge the Gaps in
State Coverage, CAL. BROKER MAC., May 2005, available at http://www.calbrokermag.com/
Magazine/story/may/Disability-Cook.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
8. See CAL. EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, STATE DISABILITY INSURANCE (SDI) AND PAID FAM-
ILY LEAvE (PFL) WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS 1 (2005), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/
direp/de2588.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) [hereinafter SDI WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS].
9. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West 2003). This Comment does not consider work-
ers' compensation as it only deals with off-the-job injuries that affect an employee's ability
to work and earn income, not on-the-job injuries.
10. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2606 (West 1986 & Supp. 2005); Cal. Employment
Dev. Dep't, About the DI Program, http://www.edd.cahwnet.gov/direp/diindtx.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2004) [hereinafter About the DI Program].
11. See Insure.com, The Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, http://info.insure.
com/disability/shorttermdisability.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Basics of
Short Term Disability Insurance]; see also Insure.com, The Basics of Long Term Disability
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not pay Sam nearly enough to cover his mortgage payment and bills.
In addition, in order to qualify for private disability insurance, Sam
must have purchased it prior to his injury. Individual rates for these
plans are very expensive, 12 which discourages many who would be in-
terested in purchasing private insurance from actually doing so.
Sam's situation is not unique. The probability of a thirty-five year
old suffering a disability for more than three months during his work-
ing life is 24%.13 Replacing wages lost because of a disability is an issue
that concerns all workers. SDI, however, currently leaves Sam with in-
adequate protection.
Moreover, as SDI is a state-mandated program, almost all Califor-
nia workers must pay for SDI. 4 Yet most workers may never use these
benefits due to the relatively low probability that a worker will sustain
a debilitating injury. 15 These workers are forced to supplement other
workers' incomes who suffer disabling injuries. This is an unfair bur-
den California places on too many workers.
In short, California's current wage-replacement system for work-
ers injured off-the-job is ineffective and must be changed. The SDI
program is outdated: it is fraught with administrative problems, does
not adequately protect workers who are injured, and forces many
workers to pay for a benefit they will never use. Therefore, the State
must eliminate its flawed SDI program and mandate that employers
offer private disability insurance to their employees.
Eliminating the SDI program and mandating that employers of-
fer private insurance to their employees is an easy solution that is cost
effective to the State, employers, and employees. In addition, it will
provide added protection to injured workers so that they are not in
financial jeopardy.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the
SDI and private disability systems currently in place in California. This
includes a discussion of the history of the SDI program and a compari-
son of the structure and costs of SDI and private disability insurance.
Part II examines the problems inherent in the current structure that
make privatization desirable. These include administrative problems,
Insurance, http://info.insure.com/disability/longtermdisability.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2005) [hereinafter Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance].
12. See Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
13. See Press Release, Consumer Fed'n of Am. et al., Large Majority of Workers Risk
Financial Exposure in Event of Disability, Survey Finds 2 (Apr. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/ltddisability.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
14. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2901 (West 1986 & Supp. 2005).
15. See Press Release, Consumer Fed'n of Am. et al., supra note 13, at 2.
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disability payment caps, accessibility, and use. Part III reasons that the
elimination of the SDI program and a state mandate requiring em-
ployers to offer private disability insurance is the best plan for Califor-
nia workers and employers.
I. California's Current Partial-Wage Replacement System
Employees in California generally have two options for wage-re-
placement if they are injured off-thejob and are unable to work:16
employees can collect SDI, or they can obtain private disability
insurance. 17
A. State Disability Insurance
California, along with only five states and one commonwealth, of-
fers short term disability benefits to employees. 18 SDI is a state-man-
dated, partial-wage replacement insurance program that is funded
through employee payroll deductions. 19 The program covers the ma-
jority of California employees-approximately twelve million of Cali-
fornia's workers. 20 Those not covered include railroad workers, non-
profit agency employees, employees who claim religious exemptions,
and most government employees.21
The California Legislature established the State's SDI program
during its 56th session in 1946.22 The Legislature designed disability
benefits to "compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by individ-
uals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to a min-
imum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom."23
The disability system picked up where unemployment benefits left off,
16. Although federal Social Security can be a source of disability benefits for injured
workers in California, it will not be covered in this Comment as it does not cover the first
five months of disability and requires that the individual be totally disabled. See Stacy L.
Rollings, Small and Mid-Sized Businesses Level the Playing Field with Voluntary Benefits, BUSINESS-
WOMAN MAC., Spring 2001, available at http://www.bpwusa.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?
pageid=3798 (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
17. See Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11; see also Basics of Long
Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
18. See About the DI Program, supra note 10 (indicating that only Hawaii, NewJersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico have state-funded employee disability
programs).
19. See About the DI Program, supra note 10.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Hans Adam Mattes, Unemployment Compensation Disability Benefits in California,
22J. ST. B. CAL. 132, 132 (1947).
23. Id.
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"provid[ing] partial indemnity for wage loss incurred by eligible indi-
viduals . . .because of disability."2
4
In addition to a desire to provide for the welfare of injured work-
ers, California also found that establishing SDI was a practical answer
to questions from the public surrounding an unemployment insur-
ance surplus held by the State.25 During World War II and the follow-
ing postwar period, California accumulated a surplus from employee
unemployment insurance contributions. 26 The public exerted consid-
erable pressure on the State to stop employee payroll deductions, ar-
guing that they were no longer needed.27 Rather than stop the
employee deduction system, the SDI program was established. 28
Today, the Disability Insurance Branch of the California Employ-
ment Development Department administers SDI.29 The purpose of
SDI has been expanded to
compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by any individual
who is unable to work due to the employee's own sickness or in-
jury, the sickness or injury of a family member, or the birth, adop-
tion, or foster care placement of a new child, and to reduce to a
minimum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting
therefrom.30
The SDI program is funded completely by employees; employers take
payroll deductions from the employees' paychecks and send them to
the State.31 Employees contribute 1.08%32 of their income up to
$857.71 per year for SDI. 3 3
An employee is eligible to collect SDI partial wage supplement if
she is "disabled."3 4 Under California law, "An individual shall be
deemed disabled on any day in which, because of his or her physical
or mental condition, he or she is unable to perform his or her regular
24. Pat Merrick, California's Disability Insurance System, 304 INS. L. J. 371, 372 (1948).
25. See Note, Legislative Medicine for the Sick Worker, 2 STAN. L. Rv. 345, 346 (1949).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. About the DI Program, supra note 10.
30. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2601 (West 1986 & Supp. 2005).
31. See Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't, Disability Insurance, http://wwwedd.cahwnet.
gov/direp/disdi.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Disability Insurance]; CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2901 (West 1986); Id. § 2903.
32. Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't, Tax Rates and Withholding Schedules, http://www
edd.cahwnet.gov/taxrep/taxrte9x.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Tax Rates
and Withholding Schedules]. The total SDI tax rate is 1.08%, but .08% of this goes towards
a new benefit for paid family leave that is not covered in this Comment. Id.
33. Id.
34. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2625 (West 1986 & Supp. 2005).
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or customary work."3 5 "Disability" includes "[i]llness or injury,
whether physical or mental, including any illness or injury resulting
from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition. '3 6 It is im-
portant to note that qualifying disabilities are a result of off-the-job
conduct; injuries arising on-the-job are covered by workers'
compensation. 3
7
In addition to being disabled, a qualified recipient must be em-
ployed or actively looking for work when he becomes disabled,3 8 must
have lost wages because of the disability if employed,3 9 must have
earned at least $300 during a previous base period (usually the past
four months) ,40 must be under the care of a licensed physician who
has certified the disability,4 1 and must have mailed in the proper
forms within forty-one days of becoming disabled.42
SDI recipients receive payment of a percentage of their lost wages
for up to one year. 43 The benefit amount received is based on the
employee's income level. 44 Disabled employees receive a partial wage
supplement ranging from $50 per week to $840 per week.45 The pay-
ment maximum of $840 per week applies to employees making
$19,830 or more per quarter 4 6 (or $79,320 per year). This payment is
reduced by any income in the form of sick leave pay, self-employment
income, military pay, commission, wages, residuals, part-time work in-
come, bonuses, workers' compensation benefits, insurance settle-
ments, or holiday pay.4 7
Since SDI is state-mandated, it is often the first line of protection
for employees and for some it may be the only protection. For those
35. Id. § 2626(a).
36. Id. § 2626(b)(1).
37. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West 2003).
38. See Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't, State Disability Insurance (SDI) Claim Filing and
Processing, http://wwwedd.cahwnet.gov/direp/dicfptx.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter SDI Claim Filing].
39. See id.
40. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2652 (West 1986). Interestingly, this wage require-
ment has not increased over time; this is the same amount that was required when SDI was
originally enacted even though wages have significantly increased since 1946. SeeJ. COMM.
ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DISABILITY INSURANCE, FINAL REP., Assemb. Con. Res.
No. 45, at 13 (Cal. 1965-1967).
41. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2708(c); SDI Claim Filing, supra note 38.
42. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2706.1.
43. See id. § 2653; About the DI Program, supra note 10.
44. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2655.
45. See id.; see also SDI WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS, supra note 8.
46. SDI WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS, supra note 8.
47. SDI Claim Filing, supra note 38.
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who purchase private disability insurance, it also covers wage losses
due to off-the-job injuries.
B. Private Disability Insurance
There are two categories of private disability insurance plans
available to workers for individual purchase or purchase through their
employers. 48 An employee may purchase a short term disability
("STD") policy or a long term disability ("LTD") policy, or both.49
1. Private Short Term Disability Insurance
STD pays workers a percentage of their wages if they become tem-
porarily disabled. That is, if they are unable to work for a short period
of time due to non-work related sickness or injury.50 Typically, a policy
provides a worker with a weekly portion of his wages, ranging from
50% to 66 2/3% for a period of thirteen to twenty-six weeks. 51 STD
claims are most often filed due to pregnancy, pregnancy complica-
tions, non-back-related injuries, back injuries, and digestive or intesti-
nal problems.52
If an employer offers a disability insurance program to its employ-
ees, it is considered a "group plan."53 Often employers incur no addi-
tional costs when offering disability insurance options to their
employees through a group plan,54 because employees directly pay for
group plans through payroll deductions. Therefore, employers need
only offer the plan and then send the contribution to the carrier.55
Educating employees about their options is a function the carrier will-
ingly provides.5 6 Supplementing premiums if the employer chooses to
do so provides the only out-of-pocket cost to an employer. 57
48. See Insure.com, Many Americans Unsure About Disability, Survey Finds, http://
info.insure.com/disability/disability40l.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
49. See id.
50. See Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Employers Benefit in Productivity ly Offering Disability Coverage, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. Riv., Mar. 3, 1997, at A7.
54. See id.
55. See UnumProvident, Product Solutions for You and Your Employees, http://www.
unumprovident.com/products/small/productsolutions.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
56. See UnumProvident, Resources to Help Manage Your Program, http://unumprov-
ident.com/products/mid/productsolutions/resroucestohelp.aspx (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
57. See id.
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The average premium for a group STD plan was $144 per year in
1999.58 Group policies are "guaranteed issue"-meaning a subscriber
does not have to take a medical exam to prove insurability.59 In 2001,
79% of employers nationwide reported offering STD benefits. 60 This
number is likely much lower in California because the presence of
SDI gives employers less incentive to offer additional disability bene-
fits. 61 A key reason given by those employers nationwide who do offer
disability plans includes attracting and retaining employees. 62
Of those companies offering STD, 77% pay the entire pre-
mium. 63 Nevertheless, even if their company does not pay the pre-
mium, employees often participate in the program. Almost one-half of
those companies offering STD benefits for employee purchase report
that over 70% of the employees purchased coverage. 64
If a worker's employer does not offer STD coverage, individual
policies are only available on a limited basis.65 These policies are hard
to find and can be expensive. 66 Some providers sell "accident policies"
that pay a person injured in an accident for each month of their in-
jury.67 Most people, however, do not opt for accident coverage. 68 In-
deed, it is recommended that an individual avoid purchasing an
individual STD plan if he has enough money saved to support himself
for a short duration should he suffer a disabling injury.69
2. Private Long Term Disability Insurance
LTD policies provide injured workers with income for a longer
period of time, such as two years, five years, or until retirement. 70
Long term disability means that a worker is unable to earn more than
58. Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
59. See id.
60. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS & JHA, INC., THE EBN/JHA DISABILITY & ABSENCE MAN-
AGEMENT SURVEY RESULTS 4 (2001), available at http://www.jhaweb.com/central/data
store/studies/ebn-2001.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter EBN/JHA SURVEY RE-
SULTS]. Smaller companies are not as willing to offer STD benefits; fifty-nine percent of
companies with two to ninety-nine employees offered STD while eighty-eight percent of
companies with greater than 5000 employees offered it. Id.
61. See Cook, supra note 7.
62. See EBN/JHA SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 60, at 4.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
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80% of his or her wages due to a sickness, pregnancy, or accidental
injury. 71 After a worker has been unable to work due to an injury for
three to six months, an LTD policy will start replacing lost wages.72
LTD policies replace anywhere from 50% to 66 2/3% of the worker's
lost wages. 73 Policyholders most often file LTD claims due to cancer,
pregnancy complications, back injuries, cardiovascular conditions,
and depression.74 Often policyholders with an injury of long duration
will use STD first and then move to LTD coverage once their STD
coverage has expired. 75
The average group LTD premium in 1999 was $180 per year.76 If
an employee leaves the company, the group LTD plan does not go
with him.77 Group insurers often provide an incentive to employers to
have workers return to work even if on a part-time basis.78 They will
give a premium reduction for allowing partially disabled employees to
return to work on a part-time basis. 79
Approximately 87% of companies nationwide offer LTD to their
employees.80 Again, these numbers are likely lower in California be-
cause of the SDI program, as the SDI program lulls people into a false
sense of security.81 Of those companies offering LTD, 65% pay for the
cost of the insurance.8 2 Larger companies are less likely to cover 100%
of the cost of LTD. 83 Nevertheless, almost one-half of the organiza-
tions that offer LTD and pay all or part of the cost of the insurance
report a participation rate of over 75% of employees purchasing the
group coverage.8 4
For workers who are unable to purchase LTD through their em-
ployers, individual LTD plans are available through financial planners
or insurance and annuities agents.8 5 Individual carriers look more
71. METLIFE SMALL Bus. CTR., METRO. LIFE INS. Co., BENEFITS DESCRIPTION; LONG
TERM DISABILITY INS. 1 (2003) (from Jill Carlstrom, MetLife Sales Representative).
72. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Cook, supra note 7.
76. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
77. Mark Lang, Disability Insurance Survival Key, STAR (Ventura County), Aug. 8, 1999,
at E02.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. EBN/JHA SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 60, at 4.
81. See Cook, supra note 7.
82. EBN/JHA SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 60, at 3.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id.
85. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
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closely at the policy applicant and consider a variety of factors to de-
termine whether they will cover him and the premium amount.
86
These factors include age, benefit amount, benefit period, current
health status, gender, tobacco use, and type of job.8 7 In addition, the
definition of disability will have an effect on the premium.88 "A policy
that pays benefits if [the worker is] unable to perform the duties of
[his] own occupation is more expensive than a policy that pays bene-
fits if [the worker is] unable to perform the duties of anyjob for which
[he is] reasonably qualified."89
Most individual LTD policies are non-cancelable, which means
that once the subscriber has taken the medical examination and been
insured, the insurer cannot cancel the policy or raise the premiums.90
In addition, most individual policies have features that allow benefits
to keep pace with inflation or gradual salary increases by adding a
percentage to the coverage each year.91 Individual LTD plans are ex-
pensive. In 2003, the average annual premium for a non-cancelable
policy was $1336.92
II. Problems with California's Current Partial-Wage
Replacement System Include Administration, Policy
Limits, Cost, and Availability
California's current wage-replacement system is fraught with
many problems including: (1) administrative problems and cost over-
runs, (2) insufficient benefit payment amounts, and (3) the require-
ment that many are forced to pay for a benefit they will never use. The
current private insurance system forces those who must purchase indi-
vidual disability insurance to pay high premiums and be subjected to
greater scrutiny for coverage than those individuals who have plans
through their employers.
86. See Am. Council of Life Insurers, Policy Cost, http://www.acli.com/ACLI/Con
sumer/Disability+Income/NM12-02+Disabiliby+Income+Insurance% 3a+Policy+Cost.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Policy Cost].
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
91. Id.
92. JHA, INC., 2003 U.S. INDIVIDUAL DISABILITY MARKET SURVEY 3 (2003), available at
http://www.jhaweb.com/central/datastore/studies/id-mrk-survey-2003.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter 2003 MARKET SURVEY].
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A. California State Disability Insurance
1. Costs and Administrative Problems Run Rampant
The SDI program has received more than its share of negative
press.93 In 1999, there was concern that the SDI fund would be $279
million in debt by the end of that year and insolvent by August 2000.9 4
Former Governor Gray Davis raised SDI rates by 80% from 2000 to
ward off insolvency. 95 More recently, it was reported that in 1999 and
2000 SDI overpaid between $124 million and $200 million in benefits
to workers who may not have been disabled.96 In addition to the over-
payment of undeserving claimants, $191 million in claims were denied
or delayed to truly disabled claimants because of paperwork errors.97
This is not surprising considering that the percentage of paperwork
mistakes made by SDI employees was 39% in 200198 and 27.5% in
2002. 9 In addition to mistakes made by SDI processors, SDI consist-
ently quarrels with the Workers' Compensation program over errone-
ous payments.10 0 California workers often try to manipulate the system
by filing both SDI and workers' compensation claims for an injury suf-
fered at work.10 1 This is because SDI pays more quickly than Workers'
Compensation so the employee is not without income for as long. 10 2
The Workers' Compensation program is required to reimburse SDI
for these payments, but it can be a slow process. 10 3 The SDI program
routinely wastes money because of these inefficiencies. 10 4
Even though the SDI program is theoretically self-supporting, the
State instituted a hiring freeze in 2002 in anticipation of layoffs due to
State budget cuts. 10 5 Because SDI is a self-supporting program, the
freeze was instituted so that unfilled positions would be available to
93. See Robert Sallady, Davis'Fix-It Man Is Back for More, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2003, at
Al; Robert Sallady, Chief of State Disability Program Quits Under Fire, Takes New Post, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 5, 2003, at Al; Dan Morian, Tax Foe Davis Quietly Oks New Payroll Bite, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at Al.
94. Morian, supra note 93, at Al.
95. See id.; see alsoJake Henshaw, State Hikes Disability Rate, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs),
Apr. 1, 2000, at lA.
96. See Disability Plan Loses Millions, supra note 5, at Al.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. SDI Program Seeks to Slow Torrent of Overpayments, CAL. WORKER'S Comp. ADVISOR,
Feb. 26, 2003.
100. Disability Plan Loses Millions, supra note 5, at Al.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. SDI Program Seeks to Slow Torrent of Overpayments, supra note 99.
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some of the workers affected by the layoffs. 10 6 The hiring freeze made
it difficult for workers to properly check the validity of claims as the
department had almost 15% fewer staff than normal.107 During this
time, over 17% of claims resulted in potential overpayments. 10 8
Moreover, administrative costs for the SDI program are high. For
the 2004-2005 fiscal year, California allocated $6.9 million of its
budget for the operation costs of the SDI program. 10 9 Even though
the program is self-supported, nearly $7 million is still too much to
pay for a program with such a high rate of administrative problems
and overpayments. It is clear that the administration of this program is
ineffective and costly to the taxpayers who are funding it. If an ordi-
nary business had a 39% error rate, it is likely that it would soon be
shutting its doors. That the SDI program has remained afloat is in-
credible. Nevertheless, simply not sinking due to administrative
problems is not enough. California workers deserve to have their earn-
ings go towards a program that is beneficial to them and in which they
can have confidence that their contributions are not wasted by ineffec-
tive administration or payment to undeserving claimants.
2. The SDI Benefit Is Insufficient for Many California Workers
As previously mentioned, SDI payments are capped at certain
levels. This means that workers above a certain income level will be
inadequately compensated if they are injured on the job.
Consider Sam, the earlier example of an injured worker. Sam
earns $75,000 per year; his weekly income is $1442. Based on his in-
come level, if Sam is injured he will collect up to $799 per week from
SDI. 110 This is $643 less per week than he made while working. Al-
though at first glance $643 per week may seem insignificant, over the
period of Sam's five-month injury, Sam will lose out on $12,860 in
earnings. This loss of earnings could significantly impact Sam's ability
to pay his mortgage and other bills, and he could quickly sink into
debt. If Sam's injury lasts more than twelve months, his situation wors-
ens. He will not receive any payment after twelve months from SDI.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. STATE OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 2004-2005 LWD 4
(2004), available at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget05/pdf/lwd.
pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
110. SDI WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS, supra note 8, at 1.
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The problem becomes even clearer as a worker's wages increase.
Lucy, another hypothetical worker, earns $100,000 per year or $1923
per week. Based on her income, if Lucy is injured her SDI payments
would be $840 per week."' 1 This amount will be $1083 less per week
than she normally earns. If injured for a period of five months, Lucy
would suffer an earnings deficit of $21,661.
The earning discrepancy does not only affect high-income work-
ers. Low-income workers are also affected. For example, if Greg earns
$30,000 per year, then his weekly income is $576. If Greg is injured,
he can collect up to $319 per week from SDI.112 This results in a $257
wage discrepancy per week; the discrepancy over a period of five
months would be $5158, a significant income loss for someone at
Greg's earning level.
Clearly, SDI does not sufficiently compensate for the lost wages of
those who are injured off-the-job. For the many workers who live
paycheck to paycheck, reliance on SDI would cause serious financial
hardship. In addition, the durational limit of SDI could have serious
financial consequences for someone who is unable to work for more
than one year.
3. SDI "Taxes" Workers for a Benefit Most Will Never Use
SDI is a mandatory program that is funded through employee
payroll deductions or "taxes."11 3 Nevertheless, "[alccording to the
U.S. Census Bureau, [an individual has] a one in five chance of be-
coming disabled." 114 This means that approximately 80% of Califor-
nia workers will never be disabled and are forced to pay for a benefit
they will never use.
In 2004, 744,542 SDI claims were filed1 15 compared to the 12 mil-
lion employees who fund the program.11 6 That means that even if all
of the SDI claims filed came from different workers, fewer than 7% of
the individuals contributing to SDI actually received the benefit this
year. Put another way, 93% of California workers were forced to pay
for a benefit they did not use. Although the basic premise of private
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Disability Insurance, supra note 31; see also Morian, supra note 93; Cal. Employ-
ment Dev. Dep't., Quick Statistics, available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/eddquickstats.asp
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Quick Statistics] (referring to disability insurance as
"Payroll Taxes Collected").
114. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
115. Quick Statistics, supra note 113.
116. About the DI Program, supra note 10.
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insurance is that many pay for a benefit they will never use, SDI is
problematic because workers do not have a choice regarding payment
for coverage or coverage level.
As previously mentioned, California employees contribute 1% of
their income to SDI, up to $857.71 per year.' 1 7 At this rate, if Sam
works for thirty years, he will have contributed more than $25,000 to
SDI. If Sam is never disabled, he will have contributed a hefty sum to
support others' lost wages without receiving any personal benefit. Sam
has no choice as to whether he wants SDI protection, or at what level.
Because Sam has no choice as to whether he wants to contribute
to SDI, California has levied a "tax" against him and other employees.
It is unlikely, however, that many of those paying this tax will ever take
advantage of it. The system forces the majority to pay for disabilities
suffered by a minority of workers. In addition, it costs workers a large
amount of income when looked at in terms of the span of one's
career.
SDI has proven to be a program that is riddled with administra-
tive problems, that does not provide sufficient benefits to workers who
suffer off-the-job injuries, and that forces many to pay for a benefit
they might not want or ever use.
B. Private Disability Insurance
Private insurance gives employees a choice as to whether or not
they want to participate in a plan, but it is not without flaws. Individual
plans are expensive and force subscribers to go through a myriad of
steps in order to be insured. Individuals seeking STD have a difficult
time even finding possibilities for coverage.11 While individual STD
policies may be available, they offer limited coverage and are
expensive."19
As previously mentioned, individual insurance can cost more
than group plans offered by employers.' 20 It is estimated that the aver-
age individual premium can cost five to ten times more than a group
policy.121 For instance, the average group LTD costs $180, 122 while the
average individual LTD plan costs $1336.123 Thus, it is much better for
117. Tax Rates and Withholding Schedules, supra note 32.
118. Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
119. Id.
120. See Lang, supra note 77, at E02.
121. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
122. Id.
123. 2003 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 92, at 3.
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employees to enroll in employer-offered group plans than to seek in-
dividual coverage.
Although group plans can be less flexible in terms of tailoring to
the individual's needs, 124 they do not usually require medical exami-
nations for subscribers and are guaranteed-issue, meaning an insurer
will often provide coverage for an employee, regardless of the em-
ployee's health. 125 Individual plans pay close attention to age, current
health status, gender, and other traits that may make it more difficult
for a subscriber to receive coverage.1 26
III. Eliminating SDI and Mandating that Employers Offer
Private Insurance Is the Solution
To provide sufficient benefits to California workers who suffer
from off-the-job injuries, California must make major changes to its
system. Eliminating SDI and mandating that employers offer private
insurance will help to ensure that workers have sufficient wage re-
placement benefits and that they are not paying for a benefit they do
not want or will never use. In addition, it will save the State money
without imposing extra costs on employers.
Every worker needs wage replacement in case she suffers an off-
the-job injury and is unable to work because a person's ability to earn
a living is her most important asset. 127 However, individuals will find
that purchasing disability insurance on their own is incredibly expen-
sive. In addition, requirements, such as medical exams, may make it
difficult for some to qualify for disability insurance.
California must pass a law mandating that employers who cur-
rently qualify under SDI offer private group disability insurance. This
does not mean that they must pay for any part of the insurance pre-
mium,just that they make private insurance available to their employ-
ees. This program will benefit the State, employees, and employers.
A. Benefit to California
Mandating private insurance eliminates an inefficient bureau-
cracy from the State's budget. Unlike the problem-riddled SDI pro-
gram, monitoring and enforcement costs for a private disability
mandate will be minimal as employees have an incentive to monitor
124. See Lang, supra note 77, at E02.
125. See Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
126. Policy Cost, supra note 86.
127. Silverman, supra note 3, at F-4.
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their employers and report to the State if they are not in compliance
with the law. The California Department of Insurance ("CDI") can
easily fold monitoring and enforcement into their current program.
Currently, the CDI "licenses and regulates the rates and practices of
insurance companies, agents, and brokers in California." 128 The CDI
is already regulating and overseeing those companies who would offer
private insurance in areas such as medical and life insurance. The CDI
Commissioner is responsible for regulatory enforcement, consumer
protection, and licensing.129 In addition, the Commissioner also re-
sponds to consumer complaints by investigating and prosecuting com-
panies accused of Insurance Code violations. 130 Monitoring the
private disability program would be an easy and cost-effective task for
the CDI, particularly since employees have an incentive to self-moni-
tor, leaving only enforcement as a real task under this mandate.
Mandating that employers offer private insurance will put Califor-
nia ahead of other states that do not offer supplemental disability pro-
grams. Those states typically do not offer any type of benefit to
employees who become injured off-the-job. Instead, these states sim-
ply inform workers how to get private disability insurance or how to
file a claim under the federal Social Security Disability program.131
States that only inform employees of how to purchase individual pri-
vate insurance or file a federal claim are doing employees a disservice
for two reasons. First, as previously mentioned, individual disability
plan rates are expensive. Second, an employee must be completely
disabled for at least five months to qualify for federal benefits. 3 2 By
mandating that employers offer private group insurance, California
will be ensuring that all employees have an opportunity to take advan-
tage of group rates and have access to coverage as soon as they are
disabled. Thus, Californians will be ahead of citizens in other states
128. Cal. Dep't of Ins., About Us, http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0500-about-us/0100-
cdi-introduction/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See N.C. DEP'T OF INS., A CONSUMER GUIDE TO DISABILITY INSURANCE 3-5 (2002),
available at http://www.ncdoi.com/consumer/publications/health%20insurance%20and
% 20managed % 20care / a % 20consumer % 20guide % 20to % 20disability % 20insurance. pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2005) (explaining private disability insurance to consumers); Mont.
Dep't of Pub. Health & Human Servs., Disability Serv. Div., Disability Determination Ser-
vices, available at http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/dsd/dds/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 22,
2006) (explaining that the department works with the social security administration to file
claims); Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., Employment Services, http://www.ides.state.il.us/
program/employer.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2005) (referring employees to the Social Se-
curity Administration for disability benefit information).
132. See Rollings, supra note 16.
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who are merely provided information without any state support be-
hind the information.
Mandating that employers offer private insurance will also benefit
the State. Because this program does not require employers to incur
costs, there is no incentive for non-compliance. Employers only have
to offer private insurance-they do not have to supplement the costs.
Because employers already have benefit programs in place, they can
roll private disability insurance into their existing health and welfare
offerings. Administration costs will be practically non-existent. Man-
dating private insurance allows California to eliminate the costly,
problematic SDI program that has been an administrative
embarrassment.
B. Benefit to Employees
Employer-sponsored group plans are much less costly to employ-
ees than individual plans and do not require subscribers to go
through the lengthier process required of individual subscribers.1 33
Requiring employers to offer private insurance will benefit em-
ployees economically. In 2005, the mean wage in California was
$42,940,'1 4 which means the average California employee pays
$429.40 per year for SDI. 13 5 As previously mentioned, group rates are
substantially lower than individual rates for private insurance.' 3 6 The
average annual premium for a group LTD policy is $180,137 which is
$211 less per year than SDI. Employers can provide employees with
large savings on private plan premiums simply by offering them.
One might be concerned that a sudden influx of companies seek-
ing group insurance would cause rates to increase dramatically. How-
ever, the private disability market is already a well-established
nationwide market. As such, the insurance market is a competitive
one, and providers will be competing for the business opportunities
that will result from this state action. This competition will benefit
private consumers, who can take advantage of lower prices as a result
of price wars aimed at outbidding the competition.
133. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
134. Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't, Occupational Employment Survey Results, available
at http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/occup$/oeswages/Cal$oes.xls (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
135. This figure is based on the required 1.08% payroll deduction minus the .08% that
funds Paid Family Leave. See Tax Rates and Withholding Schedules, supra note 32.
136. See Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11; see also 2003 MARKET
SURVEy, supra note 92, at 3.
137. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
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Currently, the voluntary disability market is experiencing a boom
and showing major growth in the employee benefit market. 138 Be-
cause benefit costs for employer-sponsored programs are increasing
due in part to an aging workforce of baby boomers, many employers
are offering voluntary plans, including LTD and STD. 139 This push
into the market means that plans are now available to workers at all
levels of the income spectrum. 140 One insurance industry commenta-
tor stated, "Benefit-wise it is a good deal for the typical low or mid-
level employee who could never afford coverage as an individual.9 141
Besides cost savings, an additional economic benefit of mandat-
ing that employers offer private disability insurance is the absence of
payment and duration caps.' 42 Policy subscribers can elect to receive
50% to 66 2/3% of their salary until age 65,143 while SDI payments
cap at a certain income level and only pay for one year. 144 Returning
to the hypothetical example of Sam who makes $75,000 per year, if he
is injured for five months and purchased private insurance at the 66
2/3% payment level, he will receive $961 per week. This is $162 more
per week than he would have received from SDI ($3240 more over the
course of his injury). In addition, if Sam's injury lasts seventeen
months, he will still have wage replacement for the final five months
of his injury. His SDI coverage would have ended after twelve months.
With regard to our other hypothetical worker Lucy, who makes
$100,000 per year, if she is injured but bought private insurance at the
66 2/3% payout rate, she will receive $1282 per week in benefits. This
is $440 more per week than she would have received from SDI; her
payment from private insurance over five months of injury would be
$8840 more than she would have received under the current State
plan.
138. Neal Lucchi, Boom Time for Voluntay Benefits: For Employees, Voluntary Benefits Are a
Matter of Economics. For Employees, It's a Matter of Priorities, RISK & INS., Apr. 1, 2004, available
at http://www.findarticles.com/p/aricles/mi mOBJK/is_415/ai_115345937 (last visited
Oct. 10, 2005).
139. See id.
140. See Molly Butler Hart, Aging of Aquarius: Death-Defying Boomers Expand the Market for
Group Disability Benefits, LEADER'S EDGE, July/Aug. 2004, available at http://www.ciab.com/
TemplateMagazine. cfm ? Section = Editorial & MagazineTimeFrameICID= 113 & Magazine
YearICID=108 (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
141, Id.
142. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
143. See id.
144. SDI WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS, supra note 8, at 1; About the DI Program, supra
note 10.
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Greg, who makes $35,000 per year, also benefits from private in-
surance even as a lower-wage earner. If he purchased insurance at the
66 2/3% payout rate, he will receive $384 per week. This is $65 more
per week than the SDI payout, or $1300 over five months. Again, if
either Greg or Lucy suffers an injury lasting more than twelve months,
they also benefit because coverage does not end after twelve months.
In addition to economic benefits, group plans provide more flexi-
bility to employees than SDI. Employees can decide whether to pay for
coverage and if so, at what level.1 45 Under SDI, employees are taxed
and have no choice with regards to participation by contribution,
while under the private insurance model employees may decide for
themselves whether this is a benefit worth purchasing. Some may
choose to purchase it while others may choose to rely on other
sources of income, such as savings or stock ownership. Employees can
also tailor their plans in terms of the amount of coverage they would
like or what premium they want to pay. More coverage means higher
premiums.' 46 Plan selection also offers employees more options
under private insurance. For example, if Sam's company has a com-
prehensive sick-leave program that allows him to accrue up to six
weeks of sick-leave, he may decide he does not need STD and may
elect to purchase only LTD.
The flexibility that mandated private insurance gives to employ-
ees in terms of choice of coverage level, premium, length of coverage,
and whether to purchase coverage at all are benefits that SDI does not
offer. Employees should be able to choose what type of insurance, if
any, their wages can pay for based on their financial needs. In addi-
tion, a private disability insurance system is economically efficient. 147
For those who do purchase it, the wealth is distributed from healthy
policyholders to disabled ones.148 Private insurance accommodates in-
dividual workers in a way that SDI cannot.
Forty-five states do not offer state-sponsored disability insurance,
leaving employees to rely on private disability insurance. 149 The work-
ers in these states have not suffered because of a lack of disability in-
surance. Economies have not collapsed because employees must rely
on private insurance. The same will be true in California-workers
145. See Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
146. See Employers Benefit in Productivity by Offering Disability Coverage, supra note 53, at A7.
147. Robert E. Wright, How Government Disables Private Disability Insurance, FREEMAN:
IDEAS ON LIBERTY, Feb. 2003, at 25.
148. Id.
149. See About the DI Program, supra note 10.
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will still have protection if they suffer an off-the-job injury that affects
their ability to work, however, that protection will now be more com-
prehensive and flexible than the protection provided by SDI.
C. Benefit to Employers
Employers can offer private disability plans without incurring any
cost. 150 As previously mentioned, 87% of employers nationwide offer
group long term disability benefits and 79% offer short term bene-
fits.151 While the average number of employers offering group cover-
age is likely less in California, there are still employers who are
currently offering these programs. 152 A mandate eliminating SDI and
requiring employers to offer private group insurance does not affect
those employers already offering plans to their employees, rather it
mirrors their approach. In fact, their payroll administration costs may
decrease because SDI deductions are no longer required. Requiring
this program will not force California businesses currently not offer-
ing disability insurance to incur great cost as they can roll it into their
existing benefits administration. Voluntary programs are easy for em-
ployers to administer.1 53 Most companies surveyed described the
ongoing administration of voluntary plans as "minor" or "a wash"
compared with the value of the programs. 154
Although supplementing the premium cost would not be re-
quired, it is likely that many businesses would choose to do so as a
recruiting and retention tool. If all companies are required to offer
such programs, some might choose to gain a competitive edge in
terms of attracting candidates and retaining employees by supple-
menting some of the employee costs of those programs. Indeed, 56%
of employers who currently supplement premium costs acknowledge
doing so to attract and retain employees. 155
Both employers and employees also benefit from incentives to re-
turn workers to their jobs, even if on a part-time basis. If a disabled
employee returns to work in some capacity, employers commonly re-
150. Employers Benefit in Productivity by Offering Disability Coverage, supra note 53.
151. EBN/JHA SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 60, at 4.
152. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec., Pay, Benefits and More, http://www.pge.com/ca-
reers/pay-benefitsmore/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005); McKesson Corp., Bene-
fits, http://www.mckesson.com/benefits.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005); The Clorox Co.
Benefits Summary, http://www.thecloroxcompany.com/careers/pdf/empl benefit_1119
04final.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
153. See Rollings, supra note 16.
154. Id.
155. EBN/JHA SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 60, at 4.
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ceive group premium reductions from carriers.' 5 6 These reductions
are then passed on to employees. The worker has an incentive to re-
turn to work in the form of a premium reduction. The employer ben-
efits because it does not have to replace injured workers for as long
with replacement workers who might be less skilled or less efficient at
the job.
One may be concerned that small and mid-sized employers would
not be in a position to offer private benefits, but these concerns are
unfounded. The voluntary market allows these companies to provide
benefit programs that are more attractive to employees, helping them
compete with larger companies in terms of recruiting. 15 7 Small em-
ployers who do not currently offer voluntary plans cite cost and low
risk of disability to their workforce as reasons for not doing so. 15 8 As
previously mentioned, however, these plans do not need to cost em-
ployers anything out of pocket so the cost concern is easily addressed.
In addition, education will show employers that the risk of disability to
their workers is high. Mandating private insurance will require em-
ployers to become educated about the risk their employees have of an
injury as well as the fact that these programs need not be costly at all.
When employers offer private disability insurance employees win
in terms of cost savings, flexibility, and ease of receiving coverage. In
addition, the program saves California money and gives employers ad-
ditional recruitment and retention mechanisms as well as incentive
for employees to return to their jobs.
Conclusion
California's current partial-wage replacement system is insuffi-
cient, administratively challenged, and imposes a tax on many who
will never reap the benefits of their contribution. Eliminating SDI and
mandating that employers offer private insurance will benefit Califor-
nia employees and the State in general. This is a step that the State
must take in order to provide its valuable work force with the benefits
necessary to survive an off-thejob injury.
With one of the world's largest economies, California is incredi-
bly dependent on its workers. The State needs to take action to pro-
156. Basics of Long Term Disability Insurance, supra note 11.
157. See Rollings, supra note 16.
158. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE: PENETRATING THE
SMALL-EMPLOYER MARKET 13 (2002), available at http://www.acli.com/NR/rdonlyres/eb6r5
gritaexavzsv6s46svzafokltsg45yxvqyapnug65jvq6mke3jkasq2xt5cbuz3lyoqwqsxhp/DI+Re-
search.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
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tect these workers in a manner that is cost-effective and that provides
sufficient benefits if they suffer an off-the-job injury. Mandating that
the SDI program is eliminated and that employees offer private insur-
ance is a cost-effective, comprehensive solution.
